We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R & D-driven endogenous Ž . w growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer 1990 Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogex nous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102 and Grossman and Ž .w Helpman 1991 Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global x Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge . Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R & D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R & D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R & D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing ) Corresponding author.
Introduction and literature summary
The past decade witnessed a notable growth in empirical and analytical studies on the origins and causes of the wealth of nations. A variety of empirical evidence indicates that national growth rates are correlated with many economic, social and political variables, including many that are affected by government policies, while a number of analytical models tend to focus more narrowly on specific sources of Ž . growth. Together, these efforts explain many of what Kaldor 1961 and others refer to as the ''stylized facts'' of economic growth. 3 One strand of analytical models focuses on capital accumulation, broadly defined to include human capital, Ž as the driving force behind economic growth Jones and Manuelli, 1990; Rebelo, . 1991; King and Rebelo, 1993 . A second approach casts external economies in a leading role in the growth process. Each firm's investment in either physical Ž . Ž . Arrow, 1962 , or human capital Lucas, 1988 inadvertently contributes to the productivity of capital held by others. The third approach, pioneered by Romer Ž . Ž . Ž . 1990 , Helpman 1991 , and Howitt 1992 , focuses on the evolution and adoption of new ideas as an engine of growth. Profit-motivated industrial innovations in R & D lead to the accumulation of technological knowledge which is only partially excludable and non-rival, and hence, becomes a source of growth. This theory also draws attention to foreign trade as a transmission in linking a country's productivity gains with advances of technological knowledge in its trade partners.
A crucial feature of the R & D-driven growth theories is their explicit identification of the mechanisms by which government policies have permanent effects on the rate of long-run growth. In one specification of the model, the main source of 3 Ž . Ž . Ž . Part of this literature is surveyed by Sala-i-Martin 1990 , Helpman 1992 , and Lucas 1993 . See Ž . also the symposium in the special issue of the Journal of Economic PerspectiÕes 1994, Vol. 8 with Ž . Ž . Ž . contributions of Helpman 1994 , Romer 1994 , and Solow 1994 for a review. The Ž . Ž . recent books by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995 and Howitt 1998 provide further sources Ž . of excellent reference. Finally, the 1998r1999 World DeÕelopment Report of the World Bank 1999 synthesizes the development policy implications of knowledge-driven growth.
( )growth originates only from own R & D. In this case, government can affect long-run growth by providing market incentives for commercial investment in research leading to new patents and blueprints. In another specification, a country can be thought of as having full access to the entire stock of global R & D, in which case policies that encourage openness in trade have strong effects on growth as international trade provides a mechanism through which technological knowl-Ž . edge developed elsewhere can be acquired domestically Coe and Helpman, 1995 . These two specifications provide the insight and guidance of this study. It has to be noted, however, that as channels for obtaining growth, they are in actuality interdependent. While the process of cumulative own R & D depends on the growth in technological knowledge developed abroad, a country is only likely to have partial access to global R & D stock, depending on its technical sophistication and capacity in transmitting global R & D knowledge into the domestic economy. Clearly, countries can take advantage of the stock of knowledge developed elsewhere '' . . . only if they develop the technological competence to search for appropriate technologies and select, absorb, and adapt imported technology'' Ž . World Bank, 1999, p. 8 . Hence, policies which stimulate own R & D activities are important as well as the policies which take advantage of global R&D. Moreover, policies to stimulate own R & D and policies to stimulate knowledge spillovers from global R & D may be complementary in the sense that one makes the other more effective.
In this study, we primarily focus on the channels through which government policy can stimulate domestic R & D activity, and create a more conducive environment for international spillovers. For this purpose, we utilize a dynamic general equilibrium model which accommodates alternative policy instruments in a market setting, based on real country data. In so doing, we take account of the rapidly expanding stock of recent econometric evidence on the nature and extent of the positive linkages between a country's two sources of productivity growth, The C & H approach has been applied and extended by others. Using panel data Ž . of 10 OECD countries, Park 1995 found that at the national level, private sector research is the more significant determinant of productivity growth in comparison with the public sector. Public research activities, however, do have indirect effects ( ) on private R & D through generating cross-border spillovers into research. Furthermore, as a determinant of private sector productivity, foreign R & D spillovers have higher output elasticities, but the domestic private R & D is found to have a higher rate of return. In Park's view, because the bulk of the world's R & D activities occur in only a few countries, the variables capturing spillovers tend to Ž . dominate their domestic counterparts. Lichtenberg and de la Potterie 1996 extend the C & H investigation to include spillovers from foreign direct investment flows Ž . as a proxy for the multinational corporations' technology transfers . Wang and Xu Ž . 1997 modified these specifications and, instead of using total imports as carriers of foreign technological knowledge, they focus exclusively on capital goods imports. Their conceptual argument was that capital goods imports would serve as a better proxy for knowledge carriers than total imports. Ž . Utilizing the same approach, Coe et al. 1997 in return investigated the extent of the international spillovers of R & D from the industrial North to the less developed South. Based on data for 77 developing countries, they found evidence that R & D spillovers from the North to the South are substantial and ''that a developing country's total factor productivity is larger the larger is its foreign Ž R & D capital stock, the more open it is to machinery and equipment capital . goods imports from the industrial countries, and the more educated is its labor Ž . force'' p. 135 . Ž . Similarly, Lee 1995 presented an endogenous growth model of an open economy in which the growth rate of income can be influenced by the ratio of imported to domestically produced capital goods in the composition of investment. He finds a significant and positive effect on per capita income growth rates as this ratio rises. Ž . Ž . Ž . Following another route, Scherer 1984 , Jaffe 1986 , Branstetter 1996 , and Ž . Keller 1997 claimed that studies employing country-level data miss much of the characteristics of the nature of technological knowledge flows, and focused instead on industry-level data between firms. Needless to assert, one may also claim that technology flows are not unidirectional; i.e., they are also transferred from the buyers to the sellers, or from the downstream to the upstream industries. This Ž . point is pursued in the work of Mansfield 1984 .
Ž . 4 Much of this literature is surveyed in the work of Taylor 1996 wherein he also extends a model where government's incentives to restrict trade may endogenously change over time as growth alters the domestic production structure. Taylor 4 The reader may also wish to take account of the remaining stock of the empirics of growth Ž . Ž . literature surmised here for space limitations. Barro 1991 , Levine and Renelt 1992 , Mankiw et Kortum 1993 , Jones 1995a , Chari et al. 1996 and Eaton and Kortum 1996 ( )also draws attention to the fact that much of the empirics of the trade policy implications of the new growth theory hinge upon the specification of the knowledge transmission function, whether it diffuses slowly over time or instantaneously.
Ž . All of this is not without its critics. Keller 1996 , for instance, pointed out the fact that even if a relationship exists between the diffusion of technological knowledge and domestic factor productivity, it is difficult to give it a casual interpretation; that we may actually be observing a common time trend rather than Ž . spillovers. Yet, a ''deeper'' critique is that of Jones 1995a who challenges the main premise of both the R & D and the AK-style models of endogenous growth that permanent changes in government policy lead to permanent effects on the long-run rate of economic growth. In his time series analysis of the US and the post-War OECD growth paths, Jones rejects this presumption, arguing that the long-run growth rate is invariant to conventional government policies. This finding suggests that the stock of knowledge may be subject to depreciation over time due Ž . to obsolescence. Jones 1995b; 1998 pursues this line of thought further, while Ž . Caballero and Jaffe 1993 incorporate a neo-Schumpeterian mechanism of creatiÕe destruction and knowledge spillovers into a model of economic growth.
Ž . Finally, Rodriguez-Clare 1996; 1997 also offer a critical review of contesting theories of endogenous growth and report data on international productivity Ž . differences. Rodriguez-Clare 1996 casts doubts, in particular, on the expected positive role of multinationals in affecting underdeveloped regions' growth performance through generation of linkages. He shows that such linkage effects on the Ž . host country are likely to be positive if i the good that multinationals produce Ž . uses intermediate goods intensively; ii when there are large costs of communica-Ž . tion between headquarters and the production plant; and iii when the home and host countries are not too different in terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. If, on the other hand, these conditions are reversed, the underdeveloped host country may be hurt, and the multinationals may end up creating enclaves among developing countries.
Clearly, the potential determinants of long-run growth are numerous and a single model, based on the experience of a selected number of countries cannot capture all of the long-run dynamics of the history of real world economies. For example, in his review of the growth experience of the East Asian countries, Ž . Stiglitz 1996 suggests that the determinants of growth are generally caused by a host of market failures that vary by country and by the leÕel of deÕelopment. This view implies that models focusing on a single or narrowly based determinant of growth are unlikely to explain the experience of a large number of countries. Keeping in mind the gulf that still appears to exist between the various theories of growth and the lack of empirical evidence to support one category of theory over another, it is nevertheless a useful benchmark to focus on a theoretical model where both the generation and diffusion of technological knowledge are based on market transactions. Given this setting, attention then can be directed on the extent ( )to which a decentralized market economy provides adequate incentives for the accumulation of knowledge, and how variations in economic structures, institutions, and policies might translate into variations in productivity gains.
A main focus of many of the studies reviewed above is to specify a reduced form structure to estimate the extent to which a country's total factor productivity depends on domestic and global R & D capital. Whereas in our study, we cast the problem in a structural general equilibrium setting, and simulate the market transactions of private agents as optimizers in response to various market signals and government policies. In contrast to the analytical models which tend to depict economies in more aggregate and abstract terms, our model is calibrated to a fairly disaggregated data set of a ''real'' economy -Japan.
Ž . We distinguish two sets of policies: i those which encourage own R & D Ž . activities, and ii those which tend to use other countries' technology stock through R & D cross-border spillovers. Under the second set of policies, we investigate the growth effects of trade policies. Our major finding is that, from a Ž . long-run growth perspective, a selective strategic trade policy based on growthpromoting considerations may increase a country's welfare. Full trade liberalization results in a welfare gain in the short-run, which is consistent with the Ž . conventional static welfare arguments. However, a selective targeted policy that distorts trade in a special way can succeed in generating a positive effect on productivity and stimulate the long-term rate of growth with positive long-term welfare benefits.
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In the case of i above, we study the growth consequences of own R & D promotion with the aid of two instruments, a direct subsidy on R & D activities, and indirect subsidies on the use of R & D intensive inputs. We find that these policies encourage private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R & D activities, thus effectively serving as an alternative to targeted foreign trade policies that place relatively more emphases on inducing growth from technological spillovers. Also, the cost of R & D promotion policy, as a ratio to the country's GDP, falls within a range that seems feasible, especially for a large country.
Almost all of the world's R & D activity is observed to be concentrated in the industrial countries. Hence, it is more important for a developing country to take advantage of spillovers from the developed industrial countries' stock of R & D through foreign trade. In the meantime, it is equally important to encourage domestic R & D activity so that the recipient country can actually internalize such spillovers. For this reason, the choice of Japan as a successfully industrialized country which is known to have drawn upon foreign technical knowledge seems particularly appropriate.
Japan's per capita GDP was only a third of that of the US before World War II. . of 8.1%, per annum Coe and Helpman, 1995, Table A2 . Three decades of rapid growth has placed Japan among the leading industrial nations with a ratio of R & D expenditures to GDP on par with that of the US. In this sense, the recent economic history of Japan provides a viable case for identifying the importance of government policies to promote a country's growth rate. However, we should emphasize that the purpose of this paper is not to calibrate the growth path of the Japanese economy, or to study the history of Japanese economic growth. Such a venture is beyond the scope of our analysis. 6 Rather, based on the endogenous growth theory and given plausible parameter values, our policy simulation experiments are designed to quantitatively investigate the importance and mechanisms of alternative government policies in affecting a country's long-run growth rate.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present the structure of the R & D-driven endogenous growth general equilibrium model; followed by a description of the model's data sources and the calibration method in Section 3. Section 4 reports and analyzes results of our empirical policy simulations. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
The model structure
The model is a direct application of the R & D-driven endogenous growth theory and is presented in five sub-sections, starting with the final output production, concluding with the condition for equilibrium. The use of equations is kept to a minimum as the model appears in its entirety in Appendix A. Outputs of the seven sectors are demanded in several different ways. They serve as intermediate inputs of production in each of the seven sectors; they meet the demands for final goods by households and the export demands of the foreign sector; and they are employed in investment -to produce differentiated capital varieties.
The final output production sectors
Differentiated capital, R & D, and their production
Growth is traditionally associated with capital accumulation. However, as Ž . Stiglitz 1996 notes, ''if life consisted of nothing more than adding homogeneous capital to a homogeneous production process'', it would be hard to observe any significant deviation from a given historical growth path for the world. Rather, capital is modeled here as a heterogeneous input which accumulates by increasing Ž . the number of varieties, k I , where I is the index for one type of capital variety.
Each variety of heterogenous capital is developed and produced by an individual firm. To develop and produce a new capital variety, the firm must engage in research and technical development which results in a new design or blueprint. The expenditure on the R & D is an initial up-front cost for the firm, a cost which is independent of the quantity of capital variety it produces later. As the R & D costs are not included in the marginal cost of capital variety production, we assume the existence of a legal system to protect firms' property rights to the outcome or inventions resulting from their R & D activities. This assumption precludes other firms from producing a capital variety identical to that of another firm which, together with the imperfect substitutability among varieties in the production of final goods, provides the firm with monopoly power in determining the rental price charged to producers of final goods. If the property right cannot be enforced, then other firms could compete away the monopoly rents accruing to the new idea, leaving investors with no incentive to incur the up-front cost of developing a new idea.
To conduct R & D, the monopoly firms need to employ the three primary factors, while to build new capital varieties, they need to use forgone final outputs of the seven production sectors. As each capital variety is produced by a single firm, to simplify the analysis, we assume that all monopoly firms are symmetrical, i.e., they have identical R & D production technology as well as the technology to build capital varieties. Furthermore, each firm employs the same quantities of primary inputs in R & D activity and produces the same volume of capital variety. Thus, each capital variety bears the same price to producers of final goods. In this model, spillover effects not only occur among domestic investment firms, but also originate from foreign countries. Measures of cross-border techno-Ž logical spillovers vary in the literature. Based on some econometric findings e.g., . Coe et al., 1997; Wang and Xu, 1997 , the cross-border spillovers are assumed to be generated through the imports of investment goods. These spillovers are modeled to further augment the productivity of the domestic R & D activity. This specification allows us to link foreign countries' technological knowledge with domestic R & D activities. While international trade is considered as a ''carrier'' for transmitting the spillovers, the existence of a well-established system of domestic R & D activities determines the ''absorptive capacity'' of the country to realize such technological spillovers. In formal terms, the productivity coefficient, Ž . A , in Eq. 1 is a function of cross-border spillovers, which are denoted as z . The number of new capital varieties produced at time period t is equal to the Ž . number of new ideasrblueprints produced at the same period, D M t . Ignoring depreciation, the number of accumulated capital varieties in the economy at time period t is equal to the number of blueprints available in the economy. When the number of blueprints increases, the number of capital varieties expands as well, leading to capital accumulation.
The technology for producing capital variety is presumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. Thus, unit material cost of a capital variety is a function of the final output prices, and is assumed to be the same for each producer of differentiated capital:
where MC is per unit material cost of each capital variety produced; P is the k j price of good j employed in the investment process, j s 1,2, . . . ,7; and h is the j expenditure share of that good. Ž . The employers of capital variety final good producers pay a capital rental price higher than the unit material cost multiplied by the interest rate due to the monopoly power of investors. This monopoly rental price depends on the substitution elasticity of demand for capital variety. This well-known mark-up price is: P s r MC rd, where d s 1 y 1r´, and´is the substitution elasticity of demand k k among the differentiated capital varieties. The monopoly firms have a forward-looking behavior. That is, they make investment decisions on developing new blueprints and producing new capital varieties so as to maximize the long-run expected returns from an infinite stream of monopoly revenues. In particular, the expected returns from investment must be comparable with those from holding a 'safe' asset such as bonds or bank deposits. Thus, asset market equilibrium requires, for any point in time, that the following non-arbitrage condition must hold:
for firms producing capital variety, where P is the monopoly capital rental kŽ i.
Ž . Ž . price for k i . Thus, P k i is the total revenue of the monopoly investor i in kŽ i.
Ž .
any given time period. V i is the value of the ith firm, and r is the interest rate Ž . on the safe asset. The term DV i denotes changes in the value of the ith firm with respect to time. In equilibrium, the value of the firm is equal to aggregate investment expenditures of this firm, which includes the cost of developing a new Ž . Ž Ž .. blueprint P , plus the material costs of investment goods MC k i .
Imposition of the transversality condition to rule out speculative bubbles gives:
that is, the value of the monopoly firm is equal to the discounted value of the Ž . stream of monopoly revenues, where R t is a discount factor defined according to:
As all produced capital goods bear the same rental price, final good producers Ž . employ equal quantities k i s k of each.
The household
All primary factors and the equity of the monopoly firms are owned by a representative household. The household has perfect foresight and exhibits forward-looking behavior. Aggregate consumption and savings are derived from an intertemporal utility maximization behavior. Thus, in each time t, the household maximizes:`1
Ý s 1 y s tss subject to the wealth constraint:
where r is the rate of time preference; s is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; TC is an index of overall consumption; PC is the t shadow price for the overall consumption; and TW is total wealth which includes s the present value of returns to primary factors and the value of monopoly firms. In each period, the household's income flows include primary factor incomes, capital rental income of the monopolistic firms, and government transfers. 7 The current budget constraint for the household is:
where SAV is household savings, W , W and W are unit price for the primary
factor L, G, and B, respectively, M is the number of differentiated capital, and TR is net government transfers. From this intertemporal utility maximization problem, a sequence of overall consumption and savings can be determined. TC is a composite of seven specific 7 The government consumption and investment are ignored in the model. All government tax revenues are transferred to the household lump-sum.
( )goods according to fixed expenditure shares, and its shadow price, PC, is determined by the individual good prices, according to:
where g is the expenditure share of good j. j
The foreign sector
All final products can be traded. Foreign countries' demand for each good produced in the home country is aggregated and derived from a constant elasticity Ž . of transformation function a CET function , while imported goods are country source-specific and are considered to be imperfect substitutes in consumption for the domestically produced goods. To capture the more important role of imports from industrial countries in the technological spillovers, foreign countries are aggregated into three regions: US, EU and the Rest of World. The home country's demanders of final goods choose domestic and foreign goods into each composite Ž at minimum cost according to a constant elasticity substitution function an . Armington function .
The economy has balanced trade in each time period, with the interest rate being determined endogenously.
Equilibrium
Ž .
Intratemporal equilibrium requires that at each time period: 1 demand for Ž . Ž. primary factors L, G and B equal their supply; 2 domestic demand plus export Ž . demand for the output of each sector equal its supply; 3 the output of R & D, the Ž . number of new blueprints, equal the number of new capital varieties invested; 4 household savings equal investment -costs of new blueprints plus costs of Ž . investment goods in capital variety production; 5 the value of total exports equal the value of total imports. In the steady-state equilibrium, all quantity variables grow at a constant growth rate which is proportional to the growth rate of R & D Ž . output the growth rate of the number of blueprints . Since the supply of primary factors are fixed, their prices grow at the same constant growth rate. All other endogenous prices, including prices for final goods produced and consumed domestically, the unit cost of the R & D output, the rental rate for differential capital, and the interest rate are constant in the steady-state.
The data and the calibration strategies
The data related to the initial period's equilibrium are drawn primarily from the Ž . Ž . Global Trade Analysis Project GTAP 1992 data base Hertel and Tsigas, 1995 , ( ) with necessary adjustments to obtain a balanced current account. As the GTAP data are originally in the form of annual flow values and primarily compiled for the purpose of static general equilibrium analyses, they need to be further augmented by information associated with the countries' growth path, namely, capital stock, technological knowledge stock, R & D expenditure, growth rate, interest rate, and the discount rate in the intertemporal utility.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1rs , in the household utility Ž . function is chosen in the range estimated by Hall 1988 The data on Japan's professional personnel occupation categories are used to adjust the original GTAP data for the labor inputs. Data on the total returns to capital in the benchmark are provided by the GTAP database. We distinguish the returns to the differentiated capital from the returns to the non-human resource based on these data. This is accomplished using the calibration restrictions implied by the model. For this purpose, we have to obtain the value of the R & D output 8 As in static applied GE models, where calibration is based on the assumption that data reflect an economy in equilibrium, we assume that the benchmark data depict an initial steady-state growth path. This steady-state assumption for the benchmark data is widely used in applied intertemporal general Ž equilibrium models for example, Goulder and Summers, 1989; Go, 1994; Diao et al., 1996 Diao et al., , 1999 . Mercenier and Yeldan, 1997 . 9 For example, in 1990, the industrial countries accounted for 96% of total world R&D expenditures. For different spillover elasticities, the simulation outcomes may be different. For this reason, we choose the initial value of spillover coefficient, z , with two different 0 levels of spillover elasticities, j , i.e., the high and low levels. We compare the simulation outcomes corresponding to these two different elasticities.
To ensure the existence of a balanced growth path, share parameters for the differentiated capital, a , in the value added functions have to be the same for all k sectors. Based on this steady-state restriction, and further assuming d s a for k simplification, we calibrate a and the total investment, including the value of 
Policy analysis
We now utilize the model to study issues of strategic trade policies and R & D promotion policies. We first consider how trade policy affects domestic R & D production as well as the use of global technological stock through R & D cross-border spillovers. The GTAP data on Japanese foreign trade reveal different protection rates among the seven sectors. Tariff rates protecting the three manufacturing sectors are very low, in the range of 1-3%, while in the case of agriculture, the tariff plus the non-tariff equivalent protection rate is quite high. The rate of protection is 106 and 82% for agricultural imports from US and EU, respectively, and averages about 42% overall. Given these facts, the question is whether the current trade policy or any alternative policy is preferred for the purpose of Ž . long-term growth. We assess this question by conducting three experiments: a liberalizing agricultural trade by eliminating all tariff and non-tariff protection on Ž . agricultural imports; b protecting manufacture by arbitrarily imposing a 50% tariff rate on manufacturing imports and removing agricultural protection com-Ž . pletely; and c further intensifying trade protection in agriculture by arbitrarily raising the tariff rate on agricultural imports by 50%, while maintaining the open stance of the rest of the economy as indicated in the initial data. In fact, since Japanese agriculture is highly protected in the benchmark data and protection rates for the non-agricultural sectors are relatively low, the first scenario is equivalent to a full trade liberalization scenario for Japan. We report the simulation results for both the transitional equilibria and the new steady-state. Transitional dynamics are derived from the time discrete model over an interval of 150 years, with each equilibria spaced 1 year apart.
Effects of trade policies on growth
Major findings from our experiments are that trade policy affects long-run growth mainly through its effects on cross-border technological spillovers, while 
Resource re-allocation effects of trade policies on growth
R & D activity competes for resources with the final output sectors. Thus, if trade policies result in the protection of a final output sector which also competes with the factor used most intensively in the R & D activity, then resources are diverted to the final good sector and away from R & D production. Since the rate of accumulation of knowledge through advances in R & D production is the ultimate source of growth in this economy, the overall rate of growth slows down, despite possible short-run increases in the rate of growth of some sectors in response to re-allocation of resources. In contrast, if the sector which competes for resources with the R & D production were liberalized, and the tariff protection is Ž . imposed on the sector s which does not share the factor intensity of the R & D activities, then the ongoing trade policy would indirectly create conditions favorable to R & D production. Hence, the overall rate of growth is stimulated.
All these results, in fact, depend critically on the Stolper-Samuelson-like effects on the relative rental rates of primary resources. R & D production is not Ž . only regarded as scientistrengineer S & E intensive, but also it is the major employer of this resource in the economy. Yet, S & E is also employed by the final good producing sectors, especially by the three manufacturing sectors. Under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, the manufacturing sectors benefit from an increase in their real prices, relative to that of agriculture. An increase in manufacturing output implies an increase in the employment of S & E in these sectors. Thus, the manufacturing sectors ''pull'' S & E personnel away from the R & D activities. However, this implies that the long-run effects of the agricultural liberalization policy have adverse consequences on the production of new blueprints.
Furthermore, the investment decision of the monopoly firms are also affected by the trade policy. Given other costs, if the monopoly profits fall relatively to the initial R & D expenditures, investment in developing and producing new capital varieties decline. Under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, monopoly profits relative to the initial R & D expenditure fall by 2.6%. The main reason is that, as the relative prices of the manufacturing products increase, the material costs of capital investment also increase. In addition, the initial or up-front R & D Ž . costs rise as the relative price of S & E rises Table 3 , column 1 .
( )Nevertheless, the net effect of this increased competition for the resource used intensively in the R & D activities on the long-term growth of the economy is relatively small. By ignoring the cross-border spillover effect, we observe that under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, resource re-allocation leads to Ž the decline of the growth rate by only 0.015 percentage point Table 2 , column 1, . Fig. 1a . Such small growth effects are mainly the result of the comparably little impact of tariffs on relative factor prices. For example, under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, the producer prices for the three manufacturing sectors rise by more than 4%, whereas the change in the relative prices of the primary factors Ž . is less than 1% Table 3 , column 1 . Given such a small change in the relative prices of the primary inputs, the adjustment in the input use of the R & D activity is quite small.
Cross-border spilloÕer effects of trade policies on growth
In contrast to the above discussion, the cross-border technological spillovers are significantly affected by the presumed trade policies. For example, in the agricultural trade liberalization scenario which caused growth rate to slow by only 0.015% in the absence of cross-border spillovers, the long-run growth rate is lowered by 0.17 percentage points, once the cross-border spillovers are taken into Ž . account Fig. 2a . Parallel to our results originating from resource re-allocation effects, trade liberalization does not necessarily imply a faster long-run growth rate Fig. 1 . a-c Growth rate in different scenarios without spillover elasticity; base is 2.85%. for the economy. On the contrary, we find that under the high spillover elasticity specification, the rate of growth falls throughout the transitional path, and falls to Ž . 2.68% in the new steady-state Table 2 , column 2 , in comparison to the 2.85% long-run growth rate of the benchmark data.
( )
Here, the reason for the deceleration of the rate of growth is the decline in the share of investment good imports. Once the supply of manufacturing production rises following the elimination of agricultural protection, an increased portion of aggregate demand for manufacturing goods is now met by the domestic supply, and import demand for the respective goods falls. Under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, the import shares of investment goods from the US and the Ž . EU fall by about 10% Table 3 , column 3 . Given the spillover elasticity and foreign R & D stocks, with a lower share of investment good imports, the home country benefits less from the global technical knowledge embodied in foreign investment goods. The rate of domestic R & D productivity slows down, and so does the long-run rate of growth.
To further illustrate the effects of a selectiÕe trade policy on the rate of growth, Ž . we design two additional scenarios: 1 trade protection on the three manufacturing sectors are arbitrarily increased by the imposition of a 50% ad valorem tariff, Ž . while agricultural protection is eliminated, and 2 tariff rate on the agricultural ( )Ž . Fig. 2 . a-c Growth rate in different scenarios with high spillover elasticity; base is 2.85%.
( )imports is arbitrarily increased by 50% while the tariff rates on the other sectors are kept at the initial levels given in the data. Revenues of the increased tariffs are transferred to the household lump-sum. The first scenario can be seen as a reflection of the trade distortionary import-substitution policies pursued by many developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, while the second scenario is administered to emphasize the consequences of a selective, ''strategic'' trade policy on long-run growth. In the first simulation, the model results reveal a significant decline in the growth rate both along transition and in the steady-state Žthe steady-state growth rate falls to 1.99% from its benchmark rate of 2.85%, . Table 2 , column 2, Fig. 2c , while in the second simulation, the growth rate rises Ž . to 3.06% Table 2 , column 2, Fig. 2b .
These results suggest that a strategic trade policy for a country's long-run growth should be targeted towards better utilization of foreign R & D capital stock and the generation of larger cross-border technological spillovers. As R & D knowledge spillovers are carried by investment good imports, a policy which is biased towards more open trade in investment goods would lead to a superior growth performance. It is well-known that countries such as Japan and Korea, which were able to sustain high economic growth rates for more than 30 years, have been restricting their agricultural trade and simultaneously promoting manufacturing trade. Of course, the designation of such policies were based on many political and economic considerations other than growth, nevertheless, such policies would also seem to enhance their long-run rate of economic growth.
Clearly, the quantitative nature of these results depends crucially on the size of the spillover elasticities. For instance, under the agricultural trade liberalization scenario, with a lower value of spillover elasticity, the negative effects on the long-run growth rate become smaller: instead of a 2.678% rate of steady-state Ž growth in the case of high spillover elasticity, it becomes 2.789% Table 2 , . column 3, Fig. 3a , while the benchmark rate is 2.85%. Under the second scenario in which import tariff rates of the manufacturing sectors are increased to 50%, the steady-state growth rate falls to 2.585% with the low elasticity, and falls to Ž . 1.996% with the high elasticity Table 2 and Fig. 3c .
It has to be noted, however, that our evaluation of the effects of different levels of cross-border spillover elasticities is not only for purposes of sensitivity testing. Differences of spillover elasticities reported in empirical studies are also a reflection of the different levels of economic development. In general, we would expect the productivity elasticity with respect to foreign R & D capital stock to be larger for developing countries which invested little in R & D than for those large developed countries which invest heavily, and account for almost the entire R & D activity of the world. For example, in C & H, the ratio of TFP elasticity with respect to foreign R & D stock to the elasticity with respect to domestic R & D stock in the group of the seven largest OECD countries is found to be much higher Ž . than that in the group of all OECD countries Table 3, p. 869 . Thus, the ''low'' level of the cross-border elasticity scenario may be more suitable for large ( )Ž . Fig. 3 . a-c Growth rate in different scenarios with low spillover elasticity; base is 2.85%.
( )industrial countries, while the ''high'' elasticity scenario is likely to be more appropriate for countries that are in the initial stages of industrialization. 
Long-run welfare effects
We analyze the social welfare consequences of the policy simulations by the Ž . equivalent variation index used in the work of Mercenier and Yeldan 1997 . This index is derived from the intertemporal utility function which accounts for Ž Ž . . multi-period felicity effects see Eq. A34 . We find that under the trade liberalization scenario, the welfare indices change sign during the course of adjustment toward the steady-state. With a high spillover elasticity, welfare rises during the earlier period of transition to the steady-state. Gains of 1.1, 0.88 and 0.25% are obtained for the first 1, 5, and 10 years, respectively. However, with the time horizon being extended, e.g., to year 15, we observe a welfare loss of 0.5%. If the welfare effects on the steady-state path are also taken into account, the Ž . overall welfare loss increases to more than 20% Table 2 , column 2 . With a low spillover elasticity, the welfare indicator for the first 24 years turns positive, while the welfare loss for the whole path, including the path in the steady-state reduces Ž . to 7% Table 2 , column 3 .
The results on the welfare effects of the trade liberalization during early periods along the transition are consistent with the conventional static welfare arguments that free trade is the first best policy, while distorted trade is always linked with welfare losses. That is, in the short-run, efficiency gains from resource re-allocation play a dominant role in determining the welfare outcomes. However, in a relatively longer time period, when positive externalities from technological spillovers are taken into account, the welfare consequences of a trade policy are mainly determined by the long-run growth effects. These results imply that if a selective trade policy can generate a significantly positive effect on the improvement of productivity and hence succeed in stimulating the rate of growth, its welfare effects in the long-run may not be consistent with the effects in the short-run, as a static welfare argument would suggest.
Effects of R & D promoting policies on growth
In the context of this model, technical knowledge has two properties. It is ''non-rival'' in the sense that its use by one does not preclude its use by others, and it is ''partially excludable'' in the sense that a producer of differential capital obtains the property right to a blueprint at a cost that is less than its true marginal 10 However, in the less developed economies with only a nascent manufacturing sector, imports of manufacturing goods are mainly consumed as final goods, and hence, are unlikely to generate any R&D spillover of the nature considered here.
( )value. That is, while another producer of differentiated capital cannot appropriate the blueprint due to the property right, it nevertheless represents an increase in the stock of knowledge which leads, incrementally, to more efficient production of blueprints. However, the owner of the blueprint is unable to appropriate these additional returns. Consequently, the owner can only earn the monopoly profits to cover the initial expenditure on blueprint production. The second market failure is more conventional: imperfect competition in the production of differentiated capital tends to lower the scale of output of each variety of capital. In the absence of public intervention, these market failures are likely to induce agents to under-invest in the provision and acquisition of new technologies. The correction of these failures can, in principle, lead to Pareto superior outcomes.
To explore these basic mechanisms, we investigate two policy instruments, each of which promotes growth by encouraging domestic private R & D activity. One instrument is an ad valorem subsidy to the cost of inputs employed by producers of R & D. The other is an ad valorem rental price subsidy to the employers of differentiated capital. A subsidy to producers of R & D output encourages them to bid primary resources away from other sectors. The second policy is based on the consideration that employers of differentiated capital pay a rental price that exceeds its marginal product. A subsidy to the employers of differentiated capital increases its demand, thereby providing incentives to increase the production of differentiated capital due to rising rents, which in turn increases the number of new producers of differentiated capital and the production of blueprints.
For each policy instrument, the subsidy rate is chosen at the level to reach the Ž long-run growth rate of the third trade policy scenario i.e., increasing the . agricultural tariff rate by 50% along with a high spillover elasticity . Our motivation here is to study as to what extent a ''strategic'' trade policy can be a substitute for policies directly promoting domestic R & D. Given our results in Section 4.1 above, we find that a strategic trade policy which further encourages manufacturing imports by, for example, increasing the protection afforded agriculture, can succeed in increasing the long-run rate of growth. From this simulation, one can determine the level of R & D subsidy necessary to achieve a comparable rate of growth, and whether the burden of the costs of such targeted subsidization would be manageable and at par with the endowments of the fiscal authority.
( )incidence of the subsidy is within an ''acceptable'' range. We find from R & D subsidy scenarios that a relatively low subsidy rate can generate a similar outcome to that observed in the third target trade scenario. The model result shows that, to reach a 3.07% long-run growth rate, the subsidy is equivalent to 6% of total R & D production costs. The subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax on household income. The cost of the R & D subsidy policies, as a ratio of gross domestic product, is found to be quite modest. In the case of the 6% R & D subsidy, the lump-sum tax is calculated to be equivalent to 0.3% of the country's GDP. Similarly, to finance the 6% subsidy to employers of differentiated capital, the Ž . lump-sum tax is equivalent to 0.8% of the GDP Figs. 4-6 .
Even though these results are sensitive to the numerical specification of the model's technical parameters, and, to some extent, on a host of characteristic features of the Japanese economy, they are directly comparable with many studies on the technology policies which found a much higher rate of return on investment Ž in R & D than that on investment in, e.g., structures, machines and equipment see . Griliches, 1994 , for a recent review . These results also suggest that different R & D policy instruments are not sensitive to the choice of the spillover elasticities and can have almost the same long-term effect on the production of R & D, and hence, a similar steady-state rate of growth, even though their respective transition paths vary as the instruments induce a fairly different resource adjustment among sectors, as we discuss in further detail below.
Adjustments induced by subsidizing domestic R & D actiÕity
The R & D cost-subsidies induce a relatively large re-allocation of primary resources, the major adjustment of which mostly occur in the first year. Initially, the three primary factors employed by the R & D sector increase by 8-10%. After When the R & D production cost is reduced by the subsidy, the stream of monopoly rents from the acquirement of the property rights to new blueprints rises. This stream of rents provides incentives to incur the fixed cost of acquiring a new blueprint, i.e., to increase the rate of creating new monopoly firms to enter the capital production sector. Thus, the output of blueprints rises steadily along both the transition and the steady-state paths. Concomitant with the increase in the production of blueprints is the increase in capital varieties. Employment of the increased number of differentiated capital in the final good production in turn increases the productivity of the primary resources in a Hick's neutral manner. Thus, compared with the base-run, outputs for all sectors start to increase after certain years, and the positive output gap rises as more years are taken into account.
As noted by the econometric analyses cited earlier, more own R & D stock is likely to allow a country to acquire relatively larger spillovers from the technological advances in the rest of world. Our simulation results, as well, show that subsidizing domestic R & D activity stimulates cross-border R & D spillovers by increasing the share of investment good imports along the transition. However, their long-run effects are quite modest. The reason is that when more resources are absorbed by the domestic R & D activity, the production of final outputs falls initially following the implementation of the R & D subsidy, and the increases in investment demand have to be met by increases in imports. Over time, as the number of capital varieties expands, the domestic production of the investment goods rises and import demand declines. Consequently, the evolution of the cross-border spillovers are not uniform over time, and their effects on the long-run Ž . growth rate are marginal Table 2 , comparing column 1 with 2 in row 8 .
We observe significant welfare gains with the R & D subsidization policy. Interestingly, however, in the initial 5 years there is a welfare loss. This is due to the consumption forgone to increase investment. Over time, as productivity rises due to enlarged domestic pool of R & D knowledge and the accumulation of capital varieties, consumers begin to enjoy the gains from faster growth at the 6th year. The equivalent variation index of the first 10, 20, 30, and 50 years indicate a 0.8, 2.9, 5 and 9.6% welfare gain, respectively, and an almost 40% gain over the entire Ž . full path, including the gains in the steady-state Table 2 .
Adjustments induced by subsidizing differentiated capital used in final production
Subsidizing the rental price of differentiated capital paid by the final producers results, initially, in a re-allocation of primary resources at levels comparable to ( )those when R & D activity is subsidized. However, in this environment, the mechanism causing this re-allocation is different. In the case of the direct R & D subsidy, firms involved in R & D activity bid primary resources away from the other sectors. In the case of subsidizing the employers of differentiated capital, on the other hand, the direct beneficiaries are the final good producers. The subsidy to the rental price of differentiated capital inputs induces them to increase factor demand. The subsidy results in a higher price received by the monopoly firms who own capital varieties but a lower cost for the final producers. The rise in the monopoly price induces the monopoly firms to develop new blueprints and produce more capital varieties.
Thus, while the two policies differ in their respective mechanisms for stimulating growth, they nevertheless generate similar results, i.e., the R & D activities compete for more resources to increase output, which in turn increases domestic technological spillovers and a higher rate of economic growth. Furthermore, the Ž . welfare gains are comparable in both cases see Table 2 .
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce and explore an applied R & D-driven endogenous Ž . growth model, whose analytical antecedents are the models of Romer 1990 and Ž . Grossman and Helpman 1991 . Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also takes into account explicitly the mechanism whereby cross-border technological spillovers augment the stock of domestic technical knowledge. The model depicts a multi-sector open economy whose major trading partners are explicitly identified. It is calibrated to ''real'' economy data, Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R & D promotion policies on the accumulation of domestic technological knowledge and the exploitation of the cross-border spillovers.
The results suggest that while trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R & D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, increases the productivity of domestic resources employed in R & D activity. The social welfare implications are evaluated in terms of the equivalent variation index. We find that under a trade liberalization strategy wherein all tariff protection is eliminated in all sectors of the economy, welfare improves initially, but then declines continually, indicating a subsequent loss of social welfare in the long-run. In the dynamic framework with endogenously determined technological progress, welfare consequences of a policy are mainly driven by the long-run growth effects, and a non-neutral trade promotion policy providing selective market incentives to trade in investment Ž . goods manufacturing industries is bound to generate a more conducive environment for growth. These results suggest that trade policy designed to affect a We further found that the fiscal cost of R & D subsidies which succeed in attaining comparable rates of growth in return to strategic trade policies is relatively small, amounting to less than 1% of the GDP.
There is now a substantial amount of empirical and anecdotal evidence that Japan's targeting policy to affect sector-and firm-specific incentives has played a critical part in helping the country to attain high and sustained rates of growth; the same has been suggested for the other so-called high performing economies of Ž . 12 East Asia HPEAs .
This literature suggests that, starting from as early as the Ž . Meiji Japan 1862-1912 , the East Asian model of economic development was based on maintaining close ties between the private enterprises and the govern-Ž . ment Morishima, 1982 . Policy makers deliberately chose, as a short cut for rapid development, to target selectiÕe industries and firms, rather than all sectors Ž . Westphal, 1982 Westphal, , 1990 Amsden, 1989; Ohkawa and Kohama, 1989; Kwon, 1994 . Furthermore, the private sectors benefited from a well-guided and active technol-Ž . ogy development policy Wade, 1990; Lall, 1992 Lall, , 1994 However, it has to be noted that any policy should be pursued prudently to assure that the dead weight losses are outweighed by gains accruing from growth. Ž . As Bardhan 1990; p. 4 noted, ''As a matter of fact, almost all states in developing countries, successful or otherwise, are interventionist, and the important question is not really about the extent but the quality of that intervention'' Ž . italic original . In this context, the policy insights of our modeling effort are 12 6 Ž . See above for the key references. See also the controversial papers by Amsden 1994 , Kwon Ž . Ž . Ž . 1994 , Lall 1994 , Page 1994 , in the Symposium on ''The World Bank Report: The East Asian Ž . Miracle '' in World DeÕelopment, 22 4 , 1994. ( ) suggestive of the routes for achieving a more conducive environment for sustained growth and improved welfare. where TC is total consumption in ''base-run''. That is, welfare gain resulting t from the policy change is equivalent from the perspective of the representative household to increasing the reference consumption profile by f%.
Glossary
Parameters
A.15. Equations for calibration
For clarity, we use bar to indicate parameters or benchmark values for some variables which are specified exogenously and hat to indicate benchmark variables which are given by the data from the Social Accounting Matrix. Symbols without a bar or a hat are the values calibrated for the benchmark. DefinêĜ DP ' PVA X q P DHRD s W Lq W Gq W Bq P kHRD
where 
